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Abstract
We examine the performance of forward-looking inﬂation-forecast-based rules in
open economies. In a New Keynesian two-bloc model, a methodology ﬁrst employed
by Batini and Pearlman (2002) is used to obtain analytically the feedback parame-
ters/horizon pairs associated with unique and stable equilibria. Three key ﬁndings
emerge: ﬁrst, indeterminacy occurs for any value of the feedback parameter on in-
ﬂation if the forecast horizon lies too far into the future. Second, the problem of
indeterminacy is intrinsically more serious in the open economy. Third, the problem
is compounded further in the open economy when central banks respond to expected
consumer, rather than producer price inﬂation.
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Under inﬂation targeting, the task of the central bank is to alter monetary conditions to
keep inﬂation close to a pre-announced target. One class of rules widely proposed under
inﬂation targeting are ‘inﬂation-forecast-based’ (IFB) rules (Batini and Haldane (1999)).
IFB rules are ‘simple’ rules as in Taylor (1993), but where the policy instrument responds
to deviations of expected, rather than current inﬂation from target. The horizon in the rule
is a policy parameter, alongside the feedback parameters. In most applications, the inﬂa-
tion forecasts underlying IFB rules are taken to be the endogenous rational-expectations
forecasts conditional on an intertemporal equilibrium of the model. These rules are of spe-
ciﬁc interest because similar reaction functions are used in the Quarterly Projection Model
of the Bank of Canada (see Coletti et al. (1996)), and in the Forecasting and Policy System
of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (see Black et al. (1997)) – two prominent inﬂation
targeting central banks. As shown in Clarida et al. (2000) – CGG (2000) henceforth–
and Castelnuovo (2003), estimates of IFB-type rules appear to be a good ﬁt to the actual
monetary policy in the US and Europe of recent years.
However, IFB rules have been criticized on various grounds. Svensson (2001, 2003)
criticizes Taylor-type rules in general and argues for policy based on explicit maximization
procedures.1 Much of the literature, however, focuses on a more speciﬁc possible problem
with Taylor-type rules – that of equilibrium indeterminacy when they are forward-looking.
Nominal indeterminacy arising from an interest rate rule was ﬁrst shown by Sargent and
Wallace (1975) in a ﬂexible price model. In sticky-price New Keynesian models this
nominal indeterminacy disappears because the previous period’s price level serves as a
nominal anchor. But now a problem of real indeterminacy emerges with IFB rules taking
two forms: if the response of interest rates to a rise in expected inﬂation is insuﬃcient, then
real interest rates fall thus raising demand and conﬁrming any exogenous expected inﬂation
(see CGG (2000) and Batini and Pearlman (2002)). But indeterminacy is also possible
if the rule is overly aggressive (Bernanke and Woodford (1997); Batini and Pearlman
(2002); Giannoni and Woodford (2002)).2 Here we extend this literature by studying the
1We discuss his critique in a longer working paper version of this paper, Batini et al. (2004), BLP
henceforth.
2Both types of real indeterminacy can be illustrated in a very simple closed economy model: consider
a special case of ‘Phillips Curve’ set out in this paper, πt = Et(πt+1) + ayt, where πt denotes inﬂation
1uniqueness and stability conditions for an equilibrium under IFB rules for various feedback
horizons in open economies, paying particular attention to possible implications for the
US/euro area region.
This paper employs the same root locus methodology employed by Batini and Pearl-
man (2002) in the closed-economy context to identify analytically the feedback parame-
ters/horizon pairs that are associated with unique and stable equilibria in a New Keynesian
sticky-price two-bloc model similar to Benigno and Benigno (2001) – BB henceforth– and
Clarida et al. (2002) – CGG (2002) henceforth. We modify the BB/CGG (2002) model to
include habit formation in consumption and inﬂation indexing, changes that help to im-
prove the ability of the model to capture the inﬂation and output dynamics observed in the
euro area and the US. We also generalize the model to allow for the possibility that agents
in the two blocs exhibit home bias in consumption patterns. This produces short-run and
long-run deviations from consumption-based purchasing power parity, and improves the
model’s ability to replicate the large and protracted swings in the real euro/dollar rate
observed since the launch of the euro.
Analyzing a two-bloc model is particularly interesting because it allows us to explore
the implications for rational-expectations equilibria of concurrent monetary policy strate-
gies of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve. In addition, by
assuming that the two blocs are identical in both fundamental parameters and in policy,
we can use the Aoki (1981) decomposition of the model into sum and diﬀerences forms;
we can then examine whether ﬁndings in the literature on the stability and uniqueness of
equilibria based on a closed-economy assumption translate to the open-economy case.
Three key ﬁndings emerge from this paper. First, we ﬁnd that indeterminacy occurs for
any value of the feedback parameter on inﬂation in the forward-looking rule if the forecast
and yt is the deviation of output from its equilibrium level. Close the model with an ad hoc ‘IS’ curve
yt = −b(it − Et(πt+1)) where it is the nominal interest rate which is set according to an IFB-Taylor rule
it = θEt(πt+1) + µyt. Substituting out for yt and it we arrive at Et(πt+1) =
1+bµ
1+bµ−ab(θ−1)πt which has a
unique rational expectations solution πt = 0 iﬀ
1+bµ
1+bµ−ab(θ−1) > 1 and a stable trajectory, tending to zero
inﬂation in the long run, consistent with any initial inﬂation rate otherwise– that is there is indeterminacy
if θ < 1 or θ > 1 +
2(1+bµ)
ab . In the latter case, overly aggressive feedback produces cycles of positive
and negative inﬂation. Thus the inclusion of a feedback on output reduces the region of indeterminacy.
Empirical estimates of µ appear to be small, as discussed in section 2. So, in our subsequent analysis, we
focus exclusively on ‘pure’ IFB rules, i.e. rules without an output gap term.
2horizon lies too far into the future.3 This reaﬃrms, for the open-economy case, results
found in the literature for the closed-economy case. Second, we ﬁnd that the problem of
indeterminacy is intrinsically more serious in an open than in a closed economy. Third, we
ﬁnd the problem is compounded further in the open economy when central banks in the
two blocs respond to expected consumer, rather than expected producer price, inﬂation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 oﬀers an overview of the main related
papers. Section 3 sets out our two-bloc model. Section 4 uses the root locus analysis
technique to investigate the stability and uniqueness conditions for IFB rules based on
producer price or consumer price inﬂation, allowing for the possibility of home consump-
tion bias. Section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Recent Related Literature
Perhaps the best-known theoretical result in the literature on IFB rules is that to avoid
indeterminacy the monetary authority must respond aggressively, that is with a coeﬃcient
above unity, but not excessively large, to expected inﬂation in the closed-economy context
(see, among others, CGG (2000) and, in the small-open-economy context, see De Fiore and
Liu (2002)and Zanna (2003)). Bullard and Mitra (2001) reworked this result in a closed-
economy model where private agents form forecasts using recursive learning algorithms.
Empirically, both the Federal Reserve in the post-Volker era and European monetary au-
thorities post 1980 appear to have indeed responded to expected inﬂation with a coﬃcient
greater than 1 (see CGG (2000); Castelnuovo (2003); Faust et al. (2001)).4
3 The fact that forward-looking behavior is a source of indeterminacy can again be illustrated using the
simple model of the previous footnote. Consider a rule involving a feedback on current inﬂation and the
current output gap: it = θπt+µyt. Then re-working the analysis we arrive at Et(πt+1) =
1+bµ+aθ(1+(b+1)µ)
1+bµ+a(1+(b+1)µ)
which has a unique RE solution πt iﬀ θ > 1. For this current-looking rule there is no upper-bound on θ:
all values above 1 ensure determinacy.
4Although empirical evidence seems to lend support to the idea that the US and European central banks
follow IFB-type rules, the Lucas Critique suggests that there is a logical distinction between observing that
a simple reduced-form relationship holds between variables and assuming that such a relation holds as a
structural equation. For example, Tetlow (2000) demonstrates that a Taylor rule may seem to explain
US monetary policy even if monetary policy is set optimally, conditioning on literally hundreds of state
variables.
3The case for an aggressive rule however has been questioned by a number of recent
theoretical studies. First, the result depends entirely on: (a) the way in which money
is assumed to enter preferences and technology; and (b) how ﬂexible prices are. In the
closed-economy context, both Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) and Benhabib et al. (2001)
showed, for example, that with sticky prices the result is overturned when money enters
the utility function either as in Sidrauski-Brock or via more realistic cash-in-advance timing
assumptions.5 With these assumptions, if the monetary authority responds aggressively
to future expected inﬂation it makes indeterminacy more likely, whereas if it does so to
past inﬂation it makes determinacy less likely.
Second, the result rests on the assumption that, in its attempt to look forward, the
central bank responds only to next quarter’s inﬂation forecast, not to forecasts at later
quarters. However, real-world procedures typically involve stabilizing inﬂation in the
medium-run, one to two years out. It follows that the above result may not translate
into sound policy prescriptions for inﬂation targeters. Complementing numerical results
by Levin et al. (2001)–LWW henceforth– Batini and Pearlman (2002) showed analytically
that IFB rules may lead to indeterminacy in the standard IS-AS optimizing forward-
looking model used, for example, by Woodford (1999). Below we build on this work to
study indeterminacy with IFB rules responding beyond one quarter in the context of a
dynamic two-bloc New-Keynesian model. In doing so we consider the impact of various
degrees of openness and price ﬂexibility on our indeterminacy results, but stick to the
conventional timing used in most open-economy optimizing-agents models whereby real
money entering the utility function refers to end-of-period balances.
3 The Model
Our model is essentially a generalization of CGG (2002) and BB to incorporate a bias
for consumption of home-produced goods, habit formation in consumption, and Calvo
price setting with indexing of prices for those ﬁrms who, in a particular period, do not
re-optimize their prices. The latter two aspects of the model follow Christiano et al. (2001)
5 De Fiore and Liu (2002) assume this latter type of cash-in-advance assumption and show, in the context
of a small open-economy model, that indeterminacy results are sensitive to the various assumptions on the
timing of transactions.
4and, as with these authors, our motivation is an empirical one: to generate suﬃcient inertia
in the model so as to enable it, in calibrated form, to reproduce commonly observed output,
inﬂation and nominal interest rate responses to exogenous shocks.
There are two equally-sized6 symmetric blocs with the same household preferences and
technologies. In each bloc there is one traded risk-free nominal bond denominated in the
home bloc’s currency. The exchange rate is perfectly ﬂexible. A ﬁnal homogeneous good
is produced competitively in each bloc using a CES technology consisting of a continuum
of diﬀerentiated non-traded goods. Intermediate goods producers and household suppliers
of labor have monopolistic power. Nominal prices of intermediate goods, expressed in the
currency of producers, are sticky.
The monetary policy of the central banks in the two blocs takes the same form; namely,
that of an IFB nominal interest rate rule with identical parameters. The money supply ac-
commodates the demand for money given the setting of the nominal interest rate according
to such a rule. Since the paper is exclusively concerned with the possible indeterminacy
or instability of IFB rules, we conﬁne ourselves to a perfect foresight equilibrium in a
deterministic environment with monetary policy responding to unanticipated transient
exogenous TFP shocks. The decisions of households and ﬁrms are as follows:
3.1 Households






















where Et is the expectations operator indicating expectations formed at time t, Ct(r) is
an index of consumption, Nt(r) are hours worked, Ht represents the habit, or desire not
to diﬀer too much from other consumers, and we choose it as Ht = hCt−1, where Ct is
the average consumption index and h ∈ [0,1). When h = 0, σ > 1 is the risk aversion
parameter (or the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution)7. Mt(r) are
6The population in each bloc is normalized at unity. It is straightforward to allow for diﬀerent sized
blocs, as in CGG (2002) and BB. Then in the Aoki decomposition, aggregates must be population-weighted
and diﬀerences expressed in per capita terms.
7When h  = 0, σ is merely an index of the curvature of the utility function.
5end-of-period nominal money balances. An analogous symmetric intertemporal utility is
deﬁned for the ‘foreign’ representative household and the corresponding variables (such as
consumption) are denoted by C∗
t (r), etc.
The representative household r must obey a budget constraint:
PtCt(r) + Dt(r) + Mt(r) = Wt(r)Nt(r) + (1 + it−1)Dt−1(r) + Mt−1(r) + Γt(r) (2)
where Pt is a price index, Dt(r) are end-of-period holdings of riskless nominal bonds
with nominal interest rate it over the interval [t,t + 1]. Wt(r) is the wage and Γt(r)
are dividends from ownership of ﬁrms. In addition, if we assume that households’ labour
supply is diﬀerentiated with elasticity of supply η, then (as we shall see below) the demand








   1
0 Wt(r)1−ηdr
  1
1−η is an average wage index and Nt =
  1
0 Nt(r)dr is aggre-
gate employment.
We assume that the consumption index depends on the consumption of a single type
of ﬁnal good in each of two identically sized blocs, and is given by
Ct(r) = CHt(r)1−ωCFt(r)ω (4)
where ω ∈ [0, 1
2] is a parameter that captures the degree of ‘openness’. If ω = 0 we have
autarky, while the other extreme of ω = 1
2 gives us the case of perfect integration. For
ω < 1
2 there is some degree of ‘home bias’.8 If PHt, PFt are the domestic prices of the two
types of good, then the optimal intra-temporal decisions are given by standard results:
PHtCHt(r) = (1 − ω)PtCt(r); PFtCFt(r) = ωPtCt(r) (5)




where k = (1 − ω)−(1−ω)ω−ω. Assume that the law of one price holds i.e. prices in home





8The eﬀect of home bias in open economies is also studied in Corsetti et al. (2002) and De Fiore and
Liu (2002).
6foreign currency prices of the home and foreign-produced goods and St is the nominal





1−ω be the foreign consumer price index corresponding
to (6). Then it follows that the real exchange rate Et =
StP∗
t
Pt and the terms of trade
T = PHt





= T 2ω−1 (7)
Thus (since 2ω − 1 ≤ 0), as the real exchange rate appreciates (i.e., Et falls) the terms of
trade improve, except at the extreme of perfect integration where ω = 1
2. Then Et = 1
and the law of one price applies to the aggregate price indices.
In a perfect foresight equilibrium, maximizing (1) subject to (2) and (3) and imposing
symmetry on households (so that Ct(r) = Ct, etc) yields standard results:



























t (Ct − Ht)σ (10)
(8) is the familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule adapted to take into account of the consumption
habit. In (9), the demand for money balances depends positively on consumption relative
to habit and negatively on the nominal interest rate. Given the central bank’s setting of
the latter, (9) is completely recursive to the rest of the system describing our macro-model
and will be ignored in the rest of the paper. (10) reﬂects the market power of households
arising from their monopolistic supply of a diﬀerentiated factor input with elasticity η.
Households can accumulate assets in the form of either home or foreign bonds. Un-
covered interest rate parity then gives






t is the interest rate paid on nominal bonds denominated in foreign currency.
3.2 Firms
Competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrms use a continuum of non-traded intermediate goods according
to a constant returns CES technology to produce aggregate output
Yt =





7where ζ is the elasticity of substitution. This implies a set of demand equations for each








   1
0 PHt(m)1−ζdm
  1
1−ζ. PHt is an aggregate intermediate price index, but
since ﬁnal goods ﬁrms are competitive and the only inputs are intermediate goods, it is
also the domestic price level.
In the intermediate goods sector each good m is produced by a single ﬁrm m using
only diﬀerentiated labour with another constant returns CES technology:
Yt(m) = At





where Ntm(r) is the labour input of type r by ﬁrm m and At is an exogenous shock
capturing shifts to trend total factor productivity (TFP) in this sector. Minimizing costs
  1
0 Wt(r)Ntm(r)dr and aggregating over ﬁrms leads to the demand for labor as shown in
(3). In a equilibrium of equal households and ﬁrms, all wages adjust to the same level Wt
and it follows that Yt = AtNt.
For later analysis it is useful to deﬁne the real marginal cost as the wage relative to


















Now we assume that there is a probability of 1 − ξ at each period that the price of
each intermediate good m is set optimally to PO
Ht(m). If the price is not re-optimized,
then it is indexed to last period’s aggregate producer price inﬂation.9 With indexation














,... . For each intermediate producer m
the objective is at time t to choose PO





















9Thus we can interpret
1
1−ξ as the average duration for which prices are left unchanged.

































+ (1 − ξ)(PO
H,t+1)1−ζ (18)
3.3 The Equilibrium and the Trade Balance
In equilibrium, goods markets, money markets and the bond market all clear. Equating the
supply and demand of the home consumer good and using (5) and its foreign counterpart
we obtain




[(1 − ω)Ct + ωEtC∗
t ] (19)
Given interest rates i,i∗ (expressed later in terms of a IFB rule) the money supply is
ﬁxed by the central banks to accommodate money demand. By Walras’ Law we can
dispense with the bond market equilibrium condition. Then a perfect foresight equilibrium




t, etc, Et, and St, given past price indices and exogenous TFP
processes.

































. Then (20) implies that zt+1 = zt. We consider a linearization
in the vicinity of a symmetric steady state, ¯ z = 1. From the transient nature of the shocks
















10In a stochastic setting with complete asset markets, (21) is simply the risk-sharing condition for
consumption, because it equates marginal rate of substitution to relative price, as would be obtained if
utility were being jointly maximized by a social planner (see Sutherland (2002)).
9The model as it stands with habit persistence (h > 0), σ > 1 and ω ∈ [0, 1
2) exhibits
net foreign asset dynamics. This can be shown by writing the trade balance TBt in the
home bloc as exports minus imports denominated its own currency:
TBt = PHtC∗










t − Ct) (22)
using (5), the law of one price PHt = StP∗




Therefore there are net foreign asset dynamics unless Ct = EtC∗
t . This is only compatible
with (21) if either ω = 1
2 (no home bias), in which case Et = 1, and we start oﬀ with
balanced trade; or if σ = 1 and h = 0 (no habit persistence).
3.4 Linearization
We linearize around a baseline symmetric steady state in which consumption and prices in
the two blocs are equal and constant. Then inﬂation is zero, Et = ¯ E = 1 and hence from
(22) trade is balanced. Output is then at its sticky-price, imperfectly competitive natural
rate and from the Keynes-Ramsey condition (8) the nominal rate of interest is given by
¯ ı = 1
β −1. Now deﬁne all lower case variables as proportional deviations from this baseline
steady state.11 Home producer and consumer inﬂation are deﬁned as πHt ≡
PHt−PH,t−1
PH,t−1 ≃
pHt − pH,t−1 and πt ≡
Pt−Pt−1
Pt−1 ≃ pt − pt−1 respectively. Similarly, deﬁne foreign producer
inﬂation and consumer price inﬂation. Combining (17) and (18), we can eliminate P0
Ht to








(1 − βξ)(1 − ξ)
(1 + βγ)ξ
mct (23)
The linearized version of the real marginal cost for producers of intermediate goods in the
home bloc, (15), is given by
mct = −(1 + φ)at +
σ
1 − h
(ct − hct−1) + φyt + ω(st + p∗
Ft − pHt) (24)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand-side of (24) is a TFP shock. The second term is a risk-
sharing eﬀect: a rise in habit-adjusted consumption leads to an increase in the real wage
11That is, for a typical variable Xt, xt =
Xt− ¯ X




where ¯ X is the baseline steady state. The
interest rate however is now expressed as an absolute deviation about ¯ i.
10(see (10)) and hence the marginal cost. The last term is a terms of trade eﬀect, which
implies that marginal costs falls if the terms of trade, pHt − st − p∗
Ft in linearized form,
rises.
Linearizing the remaining equations (7), (8), (11), (19) and (21) yields
πt − π∗











(it − Etπt+1) (26)
Et∆st+1 = it − i∗
t (27)
yt = (1 − ω)ct + ωc∗
t − 2ω(1 − ω)(pHt − st − p∗
Ft) (28)
σ(c∗
t − ct − h(c∗
t−1 − ct−1)) = −et = (1 − 2ω)(pHt − st − p∗
Ft) (29)
Note that (28) and its foreign counterpart imply that yt +y∗
t = ct +c∗
t. Also note that for
the case when there is no home bias, ω = 1/2, then (25) reduces to relative purchasing
power parity for consumer price inﬂation.
Turning to spillover eﬀects in our linearized form of the model, let us focus on the case
of no home bias, ω = 1/2. Then from (28) and (24) we obtain













It follows that the elasticity of marginal cost for intermediate goods home producers with
respect to domestic and foreign current output, given output at time t − 1, are given by
κ0 ≡ ∂mct
















(31) indicates that the risk-sharing eﬀect exceeds the terms of trade eﬀect and there
is positive spillover from output onto the marginal cost of the second bloc (implying a
negative spillover on output) iﬀ σ
1−h > 1 in the short-run (i.e., given output in period
t − 1).12 Iﬀ σ
1−h = 1, the risk-sharing and terms of trade eﬀect cancel and there are
no spillover eﬀects. Empirical estimates discussed in Appendix C of BLP suggest that
σ > 1, so under this calibration spillover eﬀects on output are negative. The eﬀect of
introducing habit is to enhance the risk-sharing eﬀect and thus increase these negative
short-run spillovers.
12 If h = 0, this replicates the result in CGG (2002).
113.5 Sum and Diﬀerence Systems
Since the economies are symmetric, the easiest way of analyzing them is to use the sum
and diﬀerence systems, as introduced by Aoki (1981). We denote all sums of home and
foreign variables with the superscript S, while we denote diﬀerences by D. The ﬁrst thing
to note when inspecting the equations above is that the sum system is independent of







































where πS = πH + π∗
F, yS = y + y∗, and we note that πH + π∗
F = π + π∗.
However the diﬀerence system does depend on the home bias parameter, ω, Writing
πD = πH − π∗























t + 2ω(st + p∗






(pHt − st − p∗
Ft) (36)
yD
t = (1 − 2ω)cD




For the case of no home consumption bias (ω = 1
2), taking ﬁrst diﬀerences of (37) and























Note, as with other models of the same New Keynesian genre, there is a small long-run
inﬂation-unemployment trade-oﬀ.
The sum and diﬀerence systems can now be set up in state-space form given the nominal
interest rate rule. This Aoki decomposition enables us to decompose the open economy
12into two decoupled dynamic systems; the sum system, that captures the properties of a
closed world economy, and a diﬀerence system that instead portrays the contribution of
openness. In principle, we could close the model with a number of diﬀerent Taylor-type
rules but here we choose to focus on IFB rules that feedback exclusively on expected
inﬂation. As discussed in BLP, it is possible to design optimal IFB rules within the
constraints deﬁned by the rule. However, the literature on determinacy, to which our
paper contributes, has a more modest objective of providing guidelines to policymakers in
the form of simple criteria for avoiding very bad outcomes that lead to multiple equilibria
or explosive behaviour. In our set-up, these guidelines focus on the choice of feedback,
interest rate smoothing and feedback horizon parameters. We now pursue this objective
by looking at how such guidelines are aﬀected when we proceed from the closed to the
open economy, and by the degree of openness in the latter.
4 The Stability and Determinacy of IFB Rules
This section studies two particular forms of simple rule, IFB rules either of the form
it = ρit−1 + θ(1 − ρ)Etπt+j (41)
where j ≥ 0 is the forecast horizon, which is a feedback on consumer price inﬂation, or of
the form
it = ρit−1 + θ(1 − ρ)EtπHt+j (42)
which is a feedback on producer price inﬂation.13 We assume that the foreign bloc has a
similar rule with the same parameters and forecast horizon.
With rules (41) or (42), policymakers set the nominal interest rate so as to respond
to deviations of the inﬂation term from target. In addition, policymakers smooth rates,
in line with the idea that central banks adjust the short-term nominal interest rate only
partially towards the long-run inﬂation target, which is set to zero for simplicity in our
set-up.14 The parameter ρ ∈ [0,1) measures the degree of interest rate smoothing. j
13Both rules are in absolute deviation form about the baseline steady state and could represent the
feedback component of monetary policy that complements a (possibly optimal) open-loop trajectory.
14For instance (41) can be written as ∆it =
1−ρ
ρ [θEtπt+j − it] which is a partial adjustment to a static
IFB rule it = θEtπt+j.
13is the feedback horizon of the central bank. When j = 0, the central bank feeds back
from current dated variables only. When j > 0, the central bank feeds back instead from
deviations of forecasts of variables from target. Finally, θ > 0 is the feedback parameter:
the larger is θ, the faster is the pace at which the central bank acts to eliminate the gap
between expected inﬂation and its target value. We now show that, for given degrees of
interest rate smoothing ρ, the stabilizing characteristics of these rules depend both on the
magnitude of θ and the length of the feedback horizon j.
4.1 Conditions for Uniqueness and Stability
To understand better how the precise combination of the pair (j,θ), IFB rules can lead the
economy into instability or indeterminacy consider the sum form of the model economy
(32) and (33) with interest rate rules of the form (41) with j = 0,1. Shocks to TFP are
exogenous stable processes and play no part in the stability analysis. We therefore set
aS
















where zt = [yS
t−1,πS
t−1,iS
t−1,] is a vector of predetermined variables and xt = [yS
t ,πS
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The condition for a stable and unique equilibrium depends on the magnitude of the
eigenvalues of the matrix A + BD. If the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle
is equal to the number of non-predetermined variables, the system has a unique stable
equilibrium with saddle-path xt = −Nzt where N = N(D). (See Blanchard and Kahn
(1980); Currie and Levine (1993)). In our sum model under control, with j = 0,1, there are
3 non-predetermined variables in zt and 2 non-predetermined variables in xt. Instability
occurs when the number of eigenvalues of A + BD outside the unit circle is larger than
the number of non-predetermined variables. By contrast, indeterminacy occurs when the
number of eigenvalues of A + BD outside the unit circle is smaller than the number of
non-predetermined variables. This implies that when a shock displaces the economy from
14its steady state, there are an inﬁnite number of possible paths leading back to equilibrium.
With forward-looking rules this can happen when policymakers respond to private sector’s
inﬂation expectations and these in turn are driven by non-fundamental exogenous random
shocks (i.e. not based on preferences or technology), usually referred to as ‘sunspots’. If
policymakers set the coeﬃcients of the rule so that this accommodates such expectations,
the latter become self-fulﬁlling. Then the rule is unable to uniquely pin down the behavior
of one or more real and/or nominal variables, making many diﬀerent paths compatible with
equilibrium (see Chari et al. (1998); CGG (2000); Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000); Svensson
and Woodford (1999); and Woodford (2000)).
In order to gain insight into the stabilizing properties of IFB rules, following Batini and
Pearlman (2002) we analyze their performance by using root locus analysis, a method that
we borrow from the control engineering literature. Appendix A outlines how this method
works. Use of this method allows us to identify analytically, for the most part, the range
of stabilizing parameters (j,θ) in our sticky-price/sticky-inﬂation models for small values
of parameters h and γ (the habit formation and price indexing parameters respectively)
before indeterminacy sets in. It also proves to be a powerful method for computing
threshold values for the general model. The method produces geometrical representations
that show how system eigenvalues change as a function of the change in any parameter in
the system. The technique involves starting from a polynomial equation and using a set of
topological theorems to track the equation’s roots as this parameter in the system varies.
The locus describing the evolution of the roots when parameters change is called the ‘root
locus’. In our particular case we are interested in detecting how the characteristic roots
of the model economy evolve as we vary the inﬂation feedback parameter θ, for given
forecast horizons j in the policy rule. As the conditions for stability and determinacy
of the model hinge on the value of these roots, from these diagrams we can infer which
regions of the (j,θ) parameter space are associated with unique and well-behaved rational
expectations equilibria. Since we condition on increasingly distant forecast horizons in the
policy rule, the method entails deriving a separate diagram for each value of j. However,
in the majority of cases a clear pattern emerges quickly, so in what follows we only draw
these diagrams at most for j = 0, 1,...,4.
In the following subsections, we use the Aoki method to analyze separately the sum
15and diﬀerence systems of two symmetric blocs pursuing symmetric IFB rules of the form
(41) or (42). For open economies both sum and diﬀerence systems must be saddle-path
stable for a stable and unique equilibrium. From the sum system (32) and (33), the central
banks’ choice of responding to consumer or price inﬂation as well as the existence of a
home bias in consumption patterns are both irrelevant in the case of the sum system. In
the case of the diﬀerence system this is no longer true, and so we investigate changes to
these assumptions separately for that case.
4.2 The Sum System
The sum form of the IFB rule is given by
iS
t = ρiS
t−1 + θ(1 − ρ)EtπS
t+j (45)
Let z be the forward operator. Taking z-transforms of (32), (33) and (45), the character-
istic equation for the sum system is given by:
(z − ρ)[(z − 1)(z − h)(βz − 1)(z − γ) −
λ
µ




(1 − ρ)(φz + µ(z − h))zj+2 = 0 (46)
where we have deﬁned λ ≡
(1−βξ)(1−ξ)
ξ and µ ≡ σ
1−h. Equation (46) shows that the
minimal state-space form of the sum system has dimension max(5,j + 3). Since there are
3 predetermined variables in the sum system, it follows that the saddle-path condition for
a unique stable rational expectations solution is that the number of roots inside the unit
circle of the complex plane is 3 and the number of outside the unit circle is max(2,j).
To identify values of (j,θ) that involve exactly three roots of equation (46) we graph
the root locus of (θ,z) pairs that traces how the roots change as θ varies between 0 and
∞. All the graphs can be drawn by following the rules set out in Appendix A. Other
parameters in the system, including the feedback horizon parameter j in the IFB rule,
are kept constant. We generate separate charts, each conditioning on a diﬀerent horizon
assumption. Each chart shows the complex plane (indicated by the solid thin line),15 the
15In this plane, the horizontal axis depicts real numbers, and the vertical axis depicts imaginary numbers.
If a root is complex, i.e. z = x + iy, then its complex conjugate x − iy is also a root. Thus the root locus
is symmetric about the real axis.
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Figure 1: Possible position of zeroes when θ = 0
unit circle (indicated by the dashed line), and the root locus tracking zeroes of equation
(46) as θ varies between 0 and ∞ (indicated by the solid bold line). The arrows indicate
the direction of the arms of the root locus as θ increases. Throughout we experiment with
both a ‘high’ and a ‘low’ λ
µ, as deﬁned after (46). The economic interpretation of these
cases is that the high λ
µ case corresponds to low ξ (i.e., more ﬂexible prices) and low σ
1−h.
From section 3.4 we have seen that the latter implies small spillover eﬀects and hence low
interdependence between the two blocs. Hence in the high λ
µ case, prices are relatively
ﬂexible and interdependence is relatively weak.
The term inside the square brackets in equation (46) corresponds to no nominal interest
rate feedback rule (i.e., an open-loop interest rate policy). Then rule (41) or (42) is
switched oﬀ and so the lagged term iS
t−1 disappears from our model; the system now
requires exactly two stable roots for determinacy. Figure 1 plots the root locus in this
case. Since with no policy θ is set to 0, the root locus is just a set of dots: namely, the
roots of equation (46) when θ = 0. Note that depending on the value of λ/µ, the position
of these roots varies, and in the ﬂexible price, low interdependence case where λ
µ is high,
there are complex roots indicating oscillatory dynamics.16 The diagram shows that there
are too many stable roots in both cases (i.e. 3 instead of 2), which implies that with no
interest rate feedback rule, there will always be indeterminacy in the sum system.
If the nominal interest rate rule is switched on and now feeds back on current rather
than expected inﬂation, i.e. j = 0, then the root locus technique yields a pattern of zeros
as depicted in Figure 2. Interest rate smoothing brings about a lag in the short-term
16How we ﬁnd the position of these zeros is the main example of Appendix A.
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Figure 2: Position of zeroes as θ changes using current inﬂation
nominal interest rate and the system is now stable if it has exactly three stable roots (as
we now have three predetermined variables in the system). The ﬁgure demonstrates that
if θ is suﬃciently large, one arm of the root locus starting originally at ρ exits the unit
circle, turning one root from stable to unstable so that there are now three – as required
– instead of four stable roots and the system has a determinate equilibrium. As θ → ∞,
there are roots at ±i∞, two roots at 0, and one at µh/(φ + µ), the latter shown as a
square.
Note that when θ = z = 1, the characteristic equation has the value 0, conﬁrming
that the branch of the root locus moving away from z = ρ crosses the unit circle at a
value θ = 1. Thus we conclude that for a rule feeding back on current inﬂation, the sum
system exhibits determinacy if and only if θ > 1. For higher values of j ≥ 1 we can draw
the sequence of root locus diagrams shown in Figures 3-6, and so conﬁrm the well-known
‘Taylor Principle’ that interest rates need to react to inﬂation with a feedback greater
than unity. However for j ≥ 1 our diagrams show that an arm of the root locus re-enters
the unit circle for some high θ > 1 and indeterminacy re-emerges. Therefore θ > 1 is
necessary but not suﬃcient for stability and determinacy. Our results up to this point are
summarized in proposition 1:
Proposition 1: In the sum system, for a rule feeding back on current inﬂation
(j = 0), θ > 1 is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for stability and deter-
minacy. For higher feedback horizons (j ≥ 1), θ > 1 is a necessary but not
suﬃcient condition for stability and determinacy.
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Figure 3: Position of zeroes as θ changes: 1-period ahead expected inﬂation
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Figure 4: Position of zeroes as θ changes: 2-period ahead expected inﬂation
Now let θS(j) be the upper critical value of θ for the sum system for a feedback
horizon j. Figure 3 shows that for the case j = 1, i.e. one-quarter ahead forecasts which
corresponds to a case studied by CGG (2000), indeterminacy occurs when this portion of
the root locus enters the unit circle at z = −1.17 The critical upper value for θ = θS(1)
when this occurs is obtained by substituting z = −1 and j = 1 into the characteristic






2(1 + h)(1 + β)(1 + γ)µ
λ(φ + µ(1 + h))
 
(47)
17Thus Figure 3 portrays diagrammatically the result shown analytically by Woodford (2003), chapter
4, that there is a value of θ = θ
S say, beyond which there is indeterminacy.
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Figure 5: Position of zeroes as θ changes: 3-period ahead expected inﬂation
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Figure 6: Position of zeroes as θ changes: 4-period ahead expected inﬂation
One important thing to note looking at this expression is that the greater is the degree
of smoothing captured by the parameter ρ in the interest rate rule, the larger the maximum
permissible value of θ before indeterminacy sets in. For j ≥ 2, Figures 4-6 show that
indeterminacy occurs when the root locus enters the unit circle at z = cos(ψ) + isin(ψ)
for some ψ ∈ (0, π
2). All our results up to this point are analytical using topological
reasoning, but now the threshold θS(j) for j ≥ 2 must be found numerically. Given j,
write the characteristic equation as
max(5,j+3)  
k=1
ak(θ)zk = 0 (48)
noting that some of the ak are dependent on θ. The root locus meets the unit circle at
z = cos(ψ) + isin(ψ). Using De Moivre’s theorem zk = cos(kψ) + isin(kψ) and equating
real and imaginary parts we arrive at two equations which can be solved numerically for
θ and ψ. Results using MATLAB are reported in the next section.
As well as locating an upper threshold θ = θS(j), an even more signiﬁcant result
concerning indeterminacy emerges from Figures 4, 5 and 6 for j ≥ 2. These have been
drawn in for values of ρ such that the two rightmost poles of the root locus are joined by
20straight lines that meet outside the unit circle. The implication is that for some values of
θ > 1, these yield unstable roots of the system, and therefore the system will have exactly
three stable roots which is what is required for determinacy. (Note that if the arms of the
root locus from ∞ cross the unit circle before these latter meet, then there may anyway be
too many stable roots). However, for a lower value of ρ it could happen that rather than
meeting to the right of z = 1, the two arms instead meet to the left of z = 1, that is inside
the unit circle and then remain within it, as in ﬁgure 7. This would imply that for all θ
there are always more than three stable roots, which would entail, in turn, indeterminacy
for all values of θ. We therefore conclude that there is determinacy for θ slightly greater
than 1 if the root locus passes through z = 1 from the left, as in ﬁgures 3-6. Conversely,
Figure 7 for the left and middle examples show indeterminacy for all θ if the root locus
passes through z = 1 from the right. However, to be certain that this result is true for all
θ, we need to be able to show that once this arm of the root locus enters the unit circle
it never leaves it, as is not the case in the right hand example of Figure 7. The simplest
case for which this ‘pathological’ behaviour cannot happen is when h = γ = 0. We can
now show:
Proposition 2: For the general model there is always some lead JS such that
for




(1 − β)(1 − γ)σ
λ(φ + σ)
(49)
there is indeterminacy for all values of θ, provided that that the arm of the
root locus from the right is ‘non-pathological’ in the sense that it enters the
unit circle only once. If h = γ = 0 this is true if β > ρ >
√





Proof : See Appendix B.
For h,γ > 0 the derivation of suﬃcient conditions that rule out pathological behaviour
has proved elusive. However for small values of h,γ, the root locus diagrams correspond
to the ‘low λ/µ’ ones of Figures 2-6, with the inner arms that lie oﬀ the real axis becoming
vanishingly small as h,γ tend to 0. By a continuity argument therefore, it follows that the
suﬃcient conditions of Proposition 2 apply in this case as well for small h,γ. Numerical
experiments indicate that pathological behaviour does not occur for all realistic values of
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Figure 7: Position of zeros as θ changes: 3-period ahead expected inﬂation, and
low ρ
the parameters.18Indeed it is extremely diﬃcult to numerically produce diagrams such as
that on the right-hand-side of ﬁgure 7. For example with other parameters set at central
values the parameter ξ must exceed 0.9, corresponding the price contracts of 10 quarters.
In addition our calibrated values indicate that the suﬃcient conditions in proposition 2
are easily satisﬁed.
Propositions 1 and 2 conﬁrm, in a rigorous setting, the possibility of real indeterminacy
for any IFB rule with lead j ≥ 1 when the feedback on producer price inﬂation is below
unity (the Taylor principle) and above a threshold θS(j). The root locus diagrams in ﬁgures
3 and 4 show that θS(1) > θS(2), so that indeterminacy becomes more of a problem as j
increases from j = 1 to j = 2. Table 1 below shows that this deterioration continues for
higher j and eventually, from proposition 2, for high j no IFB rule of the form (42) results
in a unique stable equilibrium. The value of ρ is crucial in determining the critical value
of the lead j beyond which indeterminacy sets in. The lower ρ, the lower the maximum-
permitted inﬂation horizon the central bank can respond to, and hence, the larger the
region of indeterminacy under IFB rules. Thus the absence of interest rate smoothing has
the same indeterminacy-inducing eﬀect as high j.
18BLP provides calibrated values for parameters mostly based on Smets and Wouters (2003). For the
US central values for parameters are ρ = 0.9, β = 0.99, σ = 2, φ = 0.8, γ = 0.5, ξ = 0.75 and h = 0.6,
assuming a quarterly model. Then λ = 0.086 and µ = 5.
224.3 The Diﬀerence System
In this section we analyze the eﬀect of the IFB rule in the diﬀerence system. We shall
see that, in this case, there are important diﬀerences in the conditions for determinacy
depending on (i) whether the central banks react to producer or consumer price inﬂation
and on (ii) the degree of openness of the two economies (as captured by the parameter
ω). We start by considering the case of complete integration (i.e. ω = 1
2 and no home
bias), looking ﬁrst at IFB rules based on producer price inﬂation and then at IFB rules
based on consumer price inﬂation. Then we consider the case when there is home bias,
however restricting ourselves to the case of no habit formation (h = 0) and a unit elasticity
of substitution in the utility function (σ = 1). These more restrictive assumptions imply
no foreign asset dynamics about a balanced trade steady state (since trade is always
balanced), as when we assumed no home bias. Without these restrictions we need to
address the well-known problems associated with Ramsey consumers in open economies
(see, for example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2001).19
4.3.1 No Home Bias and IFB Rules Based on Producer Price Inﬂation
With interest rates feeding back on producer price inﬂation, the IFB rule in diﬀerence
form is given by
iD
t = ρiD
t−1 + θ(1 − ρ)EtπD
t+j (50)
Taking z-transforms of (50), (39) and (40), it is now easy to show that for the diﬀerence
system the characteristic equation reduces to
(z − ρ)[(z − 1)(βz − 1)(z − γ) − λ(1 + φ)z2] + λθ(1 − ρ)(1 + φ)zj+2 = 0 (51)
The root locus diagrams for this characteristic equation will have qualitatively the same
features as those for the sum system. So propositions 1 and 2 apply to the diﬀerence
system as well. Again numerical results rule out pathological behaviour of the root loci.
By analogy with our earlier results, the critical upper value θD(1) for the diﬀerence system
19An alternative way of handling the foreign assets problem is to follow BB and CGG, among others,
and recast the model as stochastic with complete asset markets. The linearized stochastic model has an
identical deterministic component and therefore the stability analysis, which is all that concerns us in this
paper, all goes through as before. Furthermore, in that case the analysis is possible without restrictions
on h and σ for the home bias case.











and a suﬃcient condition for indeterminacy is now:




(1 − β)(1 − γ)
λ(1 + φ)
(53)
It follows from a little algebra that θS(1) > θD(1) iﬀ σ > 1−h
1+h and that JS > JD iﬀ σ > 1.
In our calibration in Appendix C we report estimates for σ well above unity. So for h ≈ 0.5,
we conclude that θS(1) > θD(1) and JS > JD for plausible parameter values. For j ≥ 2,
threshold values must be computed numerically. Figure 8 shows the areas of stability and
determinacy in (j,θ) space for the sum and diﬀerence systems. The ﬁgure indicates that
the area of indeterminacy is smaller for the diﬀerence system case. In our open economy
model, both the sum and diﬀerence systems must be stable and determinate for the world
economy to have this property. Our results indicate that in this respect the constraints
on (j,θ) for the diﬀerence system are the binding ones. Furthermore our expressions for
θS(1), θD(1), JD and JS indicate that as σ and h increase, the parameter space associated
with determinate equilibria under an IFB rule shrinks in the open-economy relative to the
closed-economy case. We synthesize these results via the following proposition:
Proposition 3. With IFB rules responding to producer price inﬂation and
with no home bias, if σ > 1 then potential indeterminacy is exacerbated in the
open economy, and it becomes worse as σ and the habit parameter h increase.
To see the intuition behind this result one needs to go back to the spill-over eﬀects of
monetary policy captured by the parameter κ1 deﬁned in (31). There we saw that as σ
1−h
increases, then the negative spillover eﬀects dominate and the stabilizing eﬀect of the IFB
rule in one bloc has the opposite eﬀect in the other bloc. Thus the rule has a beggar-thy-
neighbour character leading to possibly incompatible responses to shocks and the absence
of a unique stable equilibrium, i.e., indeterminacy. Figure 8 illustrates proposition 3 by
showing θS(j) and θD(j). As the proposition suggests, the area of indeterminacy is larger













Figure 8: Areas of Determinacy for the Sum Diﬀerence Systems: Feedback on
Producer Price Inﬂation and No Home Bias.
light grey areas in the diagram) than in the closed-economy case. As σ and h grow in
magnitude, the dark area in the diagram expands, thus increasing the negative output
spillovers between the two blocs. Also from (49) and (53) as interest rate smoothing ρ
increases, both θS(j) and θD(j) shift to the right alleviating the indeterminacy problem
for both closed and open economies alike. Table 1 quantiﬁes numerically upper critical
values for θ in the sum and diﬀerence system cases, respectively when we calibrate the
model’s parameters as described in Appendix C of BLP using US data (see footnote 18).
j j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5 j=6 j=7 j=8 j=9 j=10 j=11
θS(j) 369 60.2 12 5.5 3.5 2.62 2.05 1.67 1.40 1.18 1.02
θD(j) 247 38.2 9.6 5.1 3.4 2.57 2.04 1.66 1.39 1.18 1.02
Table 1. Critical upper bounds for θS(j) and θD(j).
4.3.2 No Home Bias and IFB Rules Based on Consumer Price Inﬂation
With no home bias purchasing power parity applies to the consumer index and therefore
πt −π∗
t = ∆st. Hence using (38) the interest rate rule of the diﬀerence system is given by
iD
t = ρiD
t−1 + θ(1 − ρ)Et∆st+j = ρiD
t−1 + θ(1 − ρ)EtiD
t+j−1 (54)
25where iD
t ≡ it − i∗
t. With the nominal interest rate (in diﬀerence system form) depending
only on leads and a lag of itself, the policy reaction function is completely decoupled from
the rest of the diﬀerence system. This leads to the result:.20
Proposition 4: When IFB rules in the two blocs respond to consumer price
inﬂation and there is no home bias in consumption, a rule for both blocs feed-
ing oﬀ consumer price inﬂation expected at any time horizon j ≥ 0 leads to
indeterminacy of the equilibrium.
Proof: From (54), iD is completely decoupled from yD and πD. It therefore follows that
the joint determinacy properties of (37) and (40) are completely independent of iD, be-
cause we can treat the latter as an exogenous variable. The relevant characteristic equation
is then given by
(βz − 1)(z − 1)(z − γ) − λ(1 + φ)z2 = 0 (55)
Root locus analysis of this equation for values of λ ranging from 0 to ∞ show that there
are always two stable roots, whereas inspection of (39) and (40) shows that determinacy
requires one stable root. Hence the system is always indeterminate.21 ¤
The intuition behind this results follows from that for IFB rules feeding back on pro-
ducer price inﬂation, as in proposition 3. Now, since targeting consumer price inﬂation
in eﬀect adds an nominal exchange rate target, the beggar-thy-neighbour character of the
rules is exacerbated. On bloc’s appreciation to reduce consumer price inﬂation has the
opposite eﬀect on the second bloc and the conﬂict between the responses of the two mon-
etary authorities is now incompatible with any saddle-path stable equilibrium. However,
as we show in our ﬁnal subsection, this extreme result is a consequence of the complete
openness of the two economies.
20See Zanna (2003) for a discussion of how conditions for determinacy are aﬀected by the choice of the
inﬂation measure to which the central bank responds to in the small-open economy case.
21Note that the decoupled interest rate process has a characteristic equation z − ρ − θ(1 − ρ)z
j = 0. By
the root locus method it can be shown that this system also has an indeterminate equilibrium for j > 1
and for j = 1 when θ >
1−ρ
1+ρ. However, for the system as a whole the indeterminacy is determined by that
of the y
D,π
D system as given in the proof.
264.3.3 The Eﬀect of Home Bias
As discussed earlier, allowing for home bias in consumption patterns has no implications
for the sum system, and we therefore only need to consider its impact on the diﬀerence
system. In this system, we can ignore problems arising from foreign asset dynamics by
focussing on the case σ = 1 and h = 0. Writing τt = pHt −st −p∗
Ft in linearized form, this
yields a representation for the diﬀerence system:
(2ω − 1)τt = cD
t (56)
yD
t = (1 − 2ω)cD










t−1 − λ(1 + φ)(τt + aD
t ) (58)
Consider ﬁrst feedback from forward-looking producer price inﬂation, given for the
diﬀerence system by (50). Together with (56) and the UIP condition, which we write in
terms of the terms of trade as
Et(τt+1) − τt = EtπD
t+1 − iD
t (59)
this generates a characteristic equation identical to that for no home bias, (51). Thus
with h = 0 and σ = 1 and feedback from producer price inﬂation, the conditions for
indeterminacy are not aﬀected by the existence of home bias.
For the case of feedback from forward-looking consumer price inﬂation, we can use
(59) to write the diﬀerence system for interest rates as
iD
t = ρiD
t−1 + θ(1 − ρ)(2ωEtiD
t+j−1 + (1 − 2ω)EtπD
t+j) (60)
This leads to a characteristic equation given by
(z−ρ)[(βz−1)(z−1)(z−γ)−λ(1+φ)z2]−θ(1−ρ)zj[2ω(βz−1)(z−1)(z−γ)−λ(1+φ)z2] = 0
(61)
Inspection of the system of dynamic equations (58), (59) and (60), shows that determinacy
requires exactly two stable roots. For the case j = 1, the root locus diagram Figure 9
shows that this is the case for a large range of θ > 1. Note that there is a branch point into
271 −1 ρ
Figure 9: Position of zeroes as θ changes, for j = 1 in the home bias diﬀerence
system with CPI inﬂation based IFB rules.
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Figure 10: Position of zeroes as θ changes, for j = 2 in the home bias diﬀerence
system with CPI inﬂation based IFB rules.
the complex plane, which returns to the real axis for a larger value of θ; as θ approaches a
further critical value, one of the zeroes tends to ∞, and beyond this critical value it heads
along the real axis from −∞. Finally, there is a critical value of θ at which z = −1, and
any higher values of θ yield indeterminacy. For j = 1 we can evaluate the upper bound
on θ as before by putting z = −1 and j = 1 in (61). For the case under consideration
with feedback from consumer price inﬂation and home bias ω  = 1
2, denote this threshold






2(1 − 2ω)(1 + β)(1 + γ)
4ω(β + 1)(1 + γ) + λ(φ + 1))
 
(62)
For j = 2, from Figure 10 the critical value at which indeterminacy occurs is not
associated with z = −1. Similar root locus diagrams to the ones we have seen earlier can
then be drawn for values of j > 2 we can now show that indeterminacy occurs for all
θ > 1, provided that the derivative of the LHS of (61) at θ = z = 1 is greater than 0. The





(1 − β)(1 − 2ω)(1 − γ)
λ(1 + φ)
= JD(CP,ω) (63)
where we denote the threshold horizon for the case of feedback from consumer price in-
ﬂation with home bias by JD(CP,ω). Note that these results do not apply when there is
no home consumption bias (ω = 1/2), because this is a knife-edge case in which nominal
relative interest rates are decoupled from the rest of the system.
We can now compare the diﬀerence systems with home bias under rules based on
producer price, and on consumer price inﬂation. Denote the θ-threshold at j = 1 and the
j-threshold for producer price based rules by θD(PP,ω) and JD(PP,ω) respectively. We
have shown that for h = 0 and σ = 1 we obtain θD(PP,ω) = θD and JD(PP,ω) = JD
obtained previously without home bias. Gathering together these results, after some
algebra we arrive at:
θD(PP,ω) − θD(CP,ω) =
4(1 + ρ)(1 + β)(1 + γ)ω[2(1 + β)(1 + γ) + λ(1 + φ)]
(1 − ρ)λ(1 + φ)[4ω(1 + β)(1 + γ) + λ(1 + φ)]
(64)
JD(PP,ω) − JD(CP,ω) =
2ω(1 − β)(1 − γ)
λ(1 + φ)
(65)
Clearly JD(PP,ω) − JD(CP,ω) increases with ω ∈ [0, 1
2] as we proceed from autarky to
a complete integration of the two economies. It is easy to show that the same is true for
θD(PP,ω) − θD(CP,ω). By analogy with the reasoning leading up to proposition 3, we
have a proposition that qualiﬁes proposition 4 by considering less that completely open
economies:
Proposition 5. Conﬁning ourselves to the case σ = 1, h = 0, with home con-
sumption bias, the potential indeterminacy of IFB rules is worse when based
on consumer rather than producer price inﬂation, and becomes increasingly
worse as the degree of openness of the two blocs increases.
5 Conclusions
This paper has examined conditions for a unique stable rational expectations equilibrium
for a symmetric two-bloc world economy where monetary authorities in both blocs pursue
29IFB rules. Most of the literature in this area assumes that the economy is closed. In
the open economy changes to nominal interest rate aﬀect aggregate demand through both
intertemporal substitution eﬀects (as in a closed economy) and terms of trade eﬀects,
working in opposite directions. Given the additional terms of trade eﬀect, it is reasonable
to expect that IFB rules would perform diﬀerently in the open economy, and indeed we
ﬁnd this to be the case.
Our results are best synthesized by focussing on the critical upper bound for the
expected inﬂation feedback parameter beyond which there is indeterminacy, θS(j) and
θD(j) for the sum and diﬀerence systems respectively, where j is the feedback horizon.
The diverse performance of rules in the closed and open economy can be summarized by
the diﬀerence θS(j) − θD(j). Consider ﬁrst the case when there is no home bias and the
degree of openness is at its maximum. For IFB rules based on producer price inﬂation
this diﬀerence is positive, indicating that indeterminacy is a more serious problem for
the open economy. If rules are based on consumer price inﬂation the problem worsens;
indeed, in the case of no home bias, an IFB rule responding to consumer price inﬂation
at any horizon j ≥ 0 (i.e., including feedback on current consumer price inﬂation) leads
to indeterminacy.22 With consumer price inﬂation feedback and some home bias, the
indeterminacy problem is less severe, but it rapidly deteriorates towards the extreme
case as the bias diminishes and the economies become more open, since in that case the
θS(j) − θD(j) increases. The rationale behind the poorer performance of IFB rules based
on consumer price inﬂation lies with beggar-thy-neighbour behavior. between two blocs
when central banks simultaneously attempt to lower domestic consumer price inﬂation,
now including an imported component, by improving their own bloc’s terms of trade.
Although the euro area and the US are not very open, and so they probably do not fall
foul of our worst case scenario, our results are nevertheless an important warning for the
ECB and the Federal Reserve, since they imply that concurrent excessive preemptiveness
in response to shocks may expose both to self-fulﬁlling sunspot sequences for any feedback
on inﬂation forecasts. Since both the ECB and the Federal Reserve focus primarily on
consumer price inﬂation 23 and not on producer price inﬂation, our results on the poor
22In fact it is straightforward to show that proposition 4 also holds for any backward lag, j < 0.
23As measured respectively by changes in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, HICP; and changes
in the Personal Consumption Expenditure, PCE, in the form of either the chain-weighted index or the
30performance of consumer price based rules also have normative implications.
A A Topological Guide to The Root Locus Technique
Here we present a brief guide to how to use the root locus technique. We start by some
standard ‘rules’ as provided in control theory textbooks, and then apply them to a speciﬁc
example.
The idea is to track the roots of the polynomial equation f(z) + θg(z) = 0 as θ moves
from 0 to ∞. Clearly for θ = 0, the roots are those of f(z) = 0, whereas when θ → ∞,
the roots are those of g(z) = 0. The root locus then connects the ﬁrst set of roots to the
second set by a series of lines and curves. We shall assume without loss of generality that
the coeﬃcient of the highest power of each of f and g is unity.
There are a number of diﬀerent ways of stating the standard control ‘rules’ that underly
the technique. One popular way (see Evans (1954)) involves just 7 steps:
1(a). Deﬁne n(f) = no. of zeros of f(z), n(g) = no. of zeros of g(z).
1(b). Loci start at the zeros of f(z), and end at the zeros of g(z) and at ∞ if
n(f) > n(g).
1(c). Loci start at the zeros of f(z) and at ∞, and end at the zeros of g(z) if n(g) >
n(f).
2. Number of loci must be equal to max(n(f),n(g)).
3. A point on the real axis is on the root locus if the number of zeros of f and g on
the real axis to its right is odd.
4. Loci ending or beginning at ∞ do so at angles to the +ve real axis given by
(2k + 1)π/(n(p) − n(z)), where k goes from 0 to (n(p) − n(z)).
5. Asymptotes at ∞ intersect the real axis at the center of gravity of the zeros of f
and g, i.e. [Sum of zeros of f - Sum of zeros of g]/(n(f) − n(g)).
6. If all coeﬃcients of f and g are real, then the root locus is symmetric about the
real axis.
7. Loci leave the real axis where ∂θ/∂z = 0.
A speciﬁc example is provided by (46) without an interest rate rule:
(z − 1)(z − h)(βz − 1)(z − γ) −
λ
µ
z2(φz + µ(z − h)) = 0
Consider changes to λ
µ. Then f(z) in the notation above has roots at 1, at h,γ both inside
the unit circle, and at 1
β outside the unit circle, while g(z) has two roots at 0 and one at
µh
φ+µ, which is less than h. Thus by Step 1(b), there will be a root at ∞. The root locus
diagrams in the main text have been drawn for the case γ <
µh
φ+µ, so we assume this for
the moment.
deﬂator.
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Figure 11: Position of zeros for varying λ
µ
By examination of the characteristic equation we see that as λ
µ → ∞, there is a root
at +∞; there is no logical possibility that it could be connected to any of the roots other
than 1
β, otherwise Step 6 would be violated. Secondly we note that there cannot be an
arm of the root locus connecting γ to 0, because it would then be impossible for either
arm starting at 1 or at h to also get to 0, without again violating Step 6. It therefore
follows that there must be an arm connecting γ to
µh
φ+µ. In order for the arms starting at
1 and h to then get to 0, they must head towards one another and then branch oﬀ into
the complex plane. Logically therefore, there is only one way of drawing the diagram, as
shown.
This diagram explains the position of the zeros as depicted in Figure 11 for low and
high λ
µ. Note that if γ >
µh
φ+µ, it is easy to show that the root locus diagram changes
very little. γ will still have an arm connecting it to
µh
φ+µ, but the arrow will point in the
opposite direction.
B Proof of Proposition 2
We prove this in several stages. Firstly we ﬁnd the conditions that ensure that the root
locus crosses the unit circle from the right. Then we derive the suﬃcient conditions that
ensure that this arm of the root locus never leaves the unit circle.
Write (46) as f + θg = 0. Taking derivatives with respect to θ, and evaluating at
θ = 1,z = 1 yields [f′(1) + g′(1)]∂z
∂θ + g(1) = 0. By inspection g(1) > 0, so that the
root locus crosses z = 1 from the right if f′(1) + g′(1) > 0. Substituting from (46) and
rearranging, this is a requirement that (49) is satisﬁed.
For the next stage of the proof we require the following two results:
Lemma 1: The arms of the root locus for j and j + 1 never intersect in the
complex plane.
Proof : Suppose that the root loci meet at a value z∗ where the corresponding θ values
for j,j + 1 are given by θj,θj+1. It then follows that θj+1z∗ = θj, which implies that z∗
must be real and not complex.
32The corollary to this result is that the arms of the root locus that lie on the real line
are common to all j.
Lemma 2: The arms of the root locus that branch out from the real axis and
then head to 0 for a given j, enclose the the corresponding arms for j + 1.
Proof : From Lemma 1, all we need is to ﬁnd one point on these arms for which this is
true. Accordingly, we show that this is the case for the branch points into the complex
plane, denoted zj. Such a branch point occurs where the derivative of the characteristic
equation is equal to 0. Denoting the characteristic equation by θzj+1+h(z) = 0, the value
of θ at the branch point, together with the value zj, is obtained by solving
θjz
j+1
j + h(zj) = 0 (j + 1)θjz
j
j + h′(zj) = 0 (B.1)
To prove the result, we now need to show that zj+1 is to the left of zj. This can be done
by demonstrating that the root locus passes through zj from the right, which is equivalent
to ∂z
∂θ < 0 at zj. This derivative is obtained by total diﬀerentiation of the characteristic
equation for j + 1:
[(j + 2)θzj+1 + h′(z)]
∂z
∂θ
+ zj+2 = 0 (B.2)
Since the branch point of interest is positive, all we need to show therefore is that
(j + 2)θzj+1 + h′(z) > 0 at z = zj. But from the proof to Lemma 1, we know that
θzj = θj, so that (j + 2)θz
j+1
j + h′(zj) = (j + 2)θjz
j
j + h′(z) = θjz
j
j > 0, using (B.1).
Remainder of Proof of Proposition 2: The sequence of root locus diagrams cor-
responding to this special case h = γ = 0 of our model is very similar to those of Figures
2-7. The key diﬀerences are that the inner arms of the root locus that branch into the
complex plane are absent, while the very short arm that lies along the real axis inside the
unit circle now ends at z = 0. Furthermore, because the only dynamics in this situation
arise from the interest rate rule, there is now only one predetermined variable for the
system. We shall establish a suﬃcient condition for λ(φ+σ)/σ, which for convenience we
deﬁne as Λ. We ﬁrst note that after setting h = γ = 0 and dividing by z2, (46) can be
rearranged as
Kzj+1 + (z − ρ)[(z − 1)(βz − 1) − Λz] = 0 (B.3)
where K is appropriately deﬁned. We are now interested in the points where the root locus
crosses the unit circle; these are given by z = eiψ, where ψ is the angle measured from the
real axis. Noting that einψ = cos(nψ)+isin(nψ), we can solve for K and ψ simultaneously
by writing (B.3) as two separate equations, one involving cos and the other sin terms. K
can be eliminated by multiplying the sin equation by cos((j + 1)ψ), and subtracting it
from the cos equation multiplied by sin((j + 1)ψ). This yields an equation of the form
β sin((j−2)ψ)−(β+βρ+1+Λ)sin((j−1)ψ)+(βρ+ρ+1+ρΛ)sin(jψ)−ρsin((j+1)ψ) = 0
(B.4)
33All the solutions other than ψ = 0,π can in principle be found by dividing this equation
by sinψ, and expressing it as a polynomial equation in cosψ of order j. By drawing two
root locus diagrams in the manner shown in the main text, one for positive values of K
and the other for negative values of K, it is straightforward to account for j −2 solutions
of (B.4).
A suﬃcient condition for no further crossings of the unit circle is to have parameter
values such that the last two of the solutions for (B.4) for cosψ are greater than 1. Now
denote the LHS of (B.4) after division by sinψ by f(cosψ). Noting that (a) the coeﬃcient
of the highest power of cosψ in f is proportional to the coeﬃcient on sin((j +1)ψ), and is
therefore negative, so f(x) tends to −∞ as x tends to ∞, and (b) f(1) = −(1−ρ)Λ < 0, it
follows that a suﬃcient condition for two roots of f being greater than 1 is that f′(1) > 0.








> j − 1 (B.5)




       
cosψ=1
= n3−n
3 . Substituting into
(B.4) we obtain
3f′(1) = −Λ(1−ρ)j3+3j2(Λ+(1−β)(1−ρ)+j(9β−3βρ−3−3ρ−2Λ−ρΛ)−6β (B.6)
Now substitute −j > −1− 1
1−ρ −
1−β




Λ ﬁrst to eliminate the j2 term, and then to eliminate the j term, ignoring
the terms with denominator Λ (all positive provided that β > ρ), which yields
3f′(1) >
Λ(ρ2 + 2ρ − 1)
(1 − ρ)2 − (1 − β)(1 + ρ) (B.7)
which is positive provided that the suﬃcient condition in proposition 2 is satisﬁed.
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